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Abstract
Evolution toward the smart grid includes
implementation of elements such as smart meters,
embedded microprocessors, two-way communication
systems from consumers to system operators, and
automated demand response as supported through
dynamic pricing. Dynamic pricing throughout the
smart grid will require frequent transfer of energy
consumption data from the customers to the ISOs.
Privacy and security issues related to transferring this
data are widely studied. However, typical frameworks
rely on a trusted third party, such as the ISO or a load
aggregator, that would then have access to all of the
consumer data.
This paper proposes a Bitcoin-like decentralized
model as a solution for secure information transfer
within the smart grid, eliminating the presence of
a centralized data aggregator or other third party
operator. Each smart meter participates as an equal
peer in the proposed peer-to-peer network, and elements
of authentication, confidentiality and data verification
are developed similar to the existing Bitcoin framework.
The contribution of this paper is the proposed
framework for the smart grid which cryptographically
secures the transfer of energy consumption data while
ensuring privacy.
1. Introduction
A power system consists of entities that generate,
transmit, distribute and consume energy. The consumers
in the power system model can be categorized into
five categories: residential, commercial, industrial,
municipal and agricultural. In the traditional model,
consumers and producers of electricity are two distinct
components of the power system. More recently, a
transactive energy model allows incorporation of entities
that both produce and consume electricity. In addition
to using energy supplied by the power system, home or
business owners can also supply energy to the grid if
they are able to produce electricity on site. Increasingly,
they are sought after to be active participants in terms of
responsive demand that can help in both lowering prices
and maintaining reliability.
1.1. The Smart Grid
A power grid is referred to as a smart grid when
the functionalities of entities of a power grid include
embedded microprocessors, two-way communications
and improved automation. It is a term that
encapsulates the addition of different forms of smart
elements to the traditional power grid infrastructure
[1]. Remote monitoring of generation, transmission and
distribution with communication technologies, negawatt
contribution by prosumers to the grid, addition of
renewable energies, automated demand response (ADR)
all fall under the umbrella the of smart grid. The
addition of any element that can support the power
system to respond to consumer demand or support the
consumer in responding to the conditions on the grid can
make the grid “smart.”
The traditional power grid does not support
two-way communications between the system operators
and the consumers. Traditional meters do not
record details of hourly or minute-by-minute power
consumption with the result that neither the ISO nor
consumers have granular (minute-by-minute, hourly)
power consumption data, and in addition consumers are
unaware of the varying cost of production of electricity.
At present, though the cost of production of
electricity increases with increased demand, this change
in cost of generation is not reflected in the prices seen
by the consumers. Adding demand response to the
evolving smart grid can be facilitated by charging the
consumers the market price. Consumers will pay a
different price per unit of electricity depending on the
time of the day and system state. A smart grid and
advanced metering infrastructure, AMI, makes such
dynamic pricing possible.
A major future goal for the smart grid is to
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eventually deploy dynamic pricing as an incentive for
the consumers to change their energy consumption
behavior and so add demand response to the consumer’s
role in the smart grid [2].
1.2. Privacy and Security
Demand response in the smart grid involves
transfer of personal information related to energy
consumption, making security and privacy concerns
crucial considerations for the smart grid. Privacy and
security are two distinct yet interdependent concepts and
the details specific to smart grid are discussed next.
Privacy usually means one’s ability to make
independent decisions about whether or not to disclose
information about oneself. Privacy also involves
making decisions about who can have access to one’s
information and who cannot. Often, privacy is achieved
through statistical methods of data aggregation. Security
on the other hand involves putting physical, technical
and network safeguards in place. Securing data
means protecting the data from potential attackers
and protecting data from being misused. Security is
viewed as a technical issue that can be solved using
cryptographic protocols.
Security is necessary to achieve privacy. Security is
the action, and privacy is the result. In the context of
data transmission between smart meters and the utilities,
a network attack to the security might compromise
privacy. If the cryptographic protocols used in the
network are not secure enough, personal data and
consequently privacy may be compromised. However,
some degree of privacy may be still preserved if strong
mathematical tools are used for data aggregation. In a
nutshell, strong security can protect privacy and using
privacy-enhancing statistical tools can take us a step
further in preserving consumer privacy.
This paper proposes a decentralized solution to
privacy and security issues in the smart grid [3]. Section
2 highlights the need for granular consumption data
along with dynamic pricing. Privacy and security
issues are discussed in the context of this granular
energy-consumption data.
The following section discusses cryptographic
protocols relevant to this paper and the framework
for Smart Grid communications proposed here. The
Solution section presents a novel decentralized solution
for data exchange within the Smart Grid, which borrows
from the architecture of the Bitcoin network.
2. Motivation
The smart grid with effective demand response in
place can play an important role in decreasing system
peaks as well as responding to alert and emergency
operating states. The goal of demand response
systems is to modify consumption behaviors by using
fine-grained pricing information [4].
2.1. Need for Granular Data
To achieve a flatter demand curve for electricity,
the ISOs will need to regularly distribute pricing
information to the consumers. Pricing information
can be communicated to the consumers using smart
meters or other forms of gateway devices depending on
the architecture chosen for data communication. The
consumers can then alter their electricity consumption
behaviors based upon the prices they see. Demand
response on the consumer’s part can be automated
or manual. The time interval at which the new
price is calculated and sent to the customers can be
hourly, every 30 minutes, every fifteen minutes or even
minute-by-minute.
We note that fine-grained details about how each
consumer uses energy is not necessary for the smart grid
to operate efficiently. Rather granularity in aggregate
energy usage per unit time is what is required. We
can look at collection of energy consumption data as an
action and distribution of pricing information as the goal
of the action.
2.2. Privacy and Security Mechanisms
To implement demand response, energy
consumption data needs to be transmitted to load
aggregators and/or system operators. Securing this
data transmission channel for energy consumption
data is important for protecting consumer privacy.
For example, behavior extraction algorithms can be
used by an adversary to obtain information about
different appliances used by the consumers [5]. With
this information, the adversary can infer whether or
not a consumer is home, which room the consumer
is occupying and what the consumer is doing while
at home. Consequently, in addition to the significant
loss of privacy, poorly secured data can can result in
physical security risks. Also, if home area network
is compromised, an attacker could control electrical
appliances within a consumer’s home.
This paper specifically addresses securing the
communication channel between the gateway devices
and the ISOs. Security issues for the gateway devices
or the HAN are not considered in the proposed solution.
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3. Background
3.1. Security and Privacy Approaches
Several approaches have been suggested to tackle
various aspects of privacy preservation in the smart grid.
Some widely-discussed solutions to privacy and security
issues in the smart grid are listed below[6]. Only some
of these tools have been carried over to the decentralized
solution presented in this paper.
Escrow Services. These services improve
anonymity of Bitcoin transactions. Though identities of
transactions are public encryption keys, the movement
of these transactions is traceable using data clustering
algorithms [7]. Clustering algorithms can also
link different public keys related to the same user.
Escrow services improve anonymity through shuffling
transactions between different users while maintaining
the correct Bitcoin amount to and from each user,
thus protecting against tracking and clustering. For
the framework proposed in this paper, the energy
consumption data will include public encryption keys
of the user as a part of the header information. Trusted
escrow services can randomize these IDs and related
data before sending them over to the utilities.
Filtering. Each appliance used in a consumer’s
home has a certain load signature. If the low
frequency components are filtered and blocked,
behavior extraction algorithms will not be able to
extract useful details about consumer behavior [6]. The
framework proposed in this paper assumes that only the
energy consumption data broadcast into the network
is filtered. The data recorded by the smart meter for
billing cannot be filtered however, because consumers
need to pay for the total number of kWh they use.
Data Aggregation. Data aggregation us a powerful
tool for protecting consumer privacy in the smart
grid. Aggregation can happen at different levels:
Home Area Network (HAN), Building Area Network
(BAN) and Neighborhood Area Network (NAN)[8]. A
privacy concern for the smart grid arises when load
aggregators have access to identifiable consumer data.
The decentralized model proposed in this paper helps to
mitigate this risk.
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy is a
statistical method of protecting consumers’ privacy
by making the effects of an individual’s data on
a distribution indistinguishable. Differential privacy
is superior to a simple data perturbation because
differential privacy preserves the statistical properties
of a distribution and guarantees better privacy-utility
trade-off [9]. In the context of a smart grid, energy
consumption data can be made differentially private by
load aggregators before sending the data to the ISOs.
Cryptographic Protocols. Cryptographic protocols
are one of the most important security tools. As
mentioned earlier, crytographically securing data
transfer is the action and the result is consumer
privacy. Several popular cryptographic methods such
as Elliptic Curve Cryptography [10], Secure Hashing
Algorithms (SHA) [10] and homomorphic encryption
[11] are all possible solutions for the smart grid.
These algorithms can help with confidentiality, integrity,
end-point authentication and non-repudiation.
While cryptography, if implemented well, is
sufficient to preserve privacy, this protection becomes
even stronger when multiple guards are in place. Of
all the privacy preserving approaches presented above,
this paper focuses on cryptographic solutions, discussed
next.
3.2. Cryptographic Protocols
Several cryptographic protocols have been proposed
for use with the smart grid, although most are targeted
towards a centralized architecture. Many of these
protocols are also relevant to a decentralized model, and
are discussed below.
Homomorphic Encryption. Homomorphic
encryption represents a group of semantically secure
encryption functions that allow certain algebraic
operations on the plain text to be performed directly on
the cipher text [11]. Carrying this idea over to the smart
grid, energy consumption data can first be encrypted
and then aggregated at each level.
Because homomorphic encryption allows the
addition of cipher text without the knowledge of plain
text, cipher text representing energy consumption by
each appliance can be simply added at the smart meter.
This will be the first level of aggregation within a home
area network. Cipher texts from different homes can be
aggregated at the load aggregator without the knowledge
of plain text representing power consumption data for
each individual house. Homomorphic encryption is
powerful because it can provide security via encryption
and can guard privacy by allowing aggregation of cipher
text.
Attribute-based Encryption and Access Control.
One paper related to a decentralized smart grid
architecture describes a decentralized architecture for
Key Distribution Centers (KDCs) for the smart grid
[8]. Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) offers limited
data access to different entities of the smart grid. ABE
encryption scheme is based on billinear pairings on
elliptic curves and can be very useful in access control.
Open Automated Demand Response (OpenADR
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2.0). Open Automated Demand Response (OpenADR)
standardizes the message format used for ADR so that
dynamic price and reliability signals can be delivered
in a uniform and interoperable fashion [12]. How
the OpenADR messages are used for demand response
is governed by HAN protocols at the consumer’s
discretion.
OpenADR 2.0 is designed to work over the Internet
using simple HTTP messages. For security, openADR
uses Transport Layer Security (TLS) on both clients and
servers. In addition to the TLS, Open ADR Alliance has
established their own certificate authority management
system with a third party vendor to ensure system-wide
secure communication[12]. OpenADR messages can
include digital signatures if non-repudiation is desired.
Smart Energy Profile (SEP 2.0). The SEP
2.0 protocol defines the behavior of smart devices
and appliances after the gateway device receives
an OpenADR message. SEP 2.0 works within a
home area network (HAN) and controls the behavior
of smart appliances within a HAN [13]. For
authentication, SEP enabled devices use elliptic curve
cryptography to dynamically establish security keys
between communicating nodes.
Similarly to OpenADR 2.0, in this paper we develop
a method for sharing demand response messages
bidirectionally between the users and the ISOs. For our
framework we use OpenADR rather than SEP. However,
while OpenADR has client server architecture, the
solution presented in the paper is decentralized, drawing
upon peer-to-peer models.
3.3. Decentralization
Pseudonymous networks such as Bitcoin or Tor
use mathematical principles and algorithms to govern
P2P networks in a decentralized framework, ensuring
that no central entity has the capability to access user
data. The addition of secure hashing and cryptographic
methods increases user trust in the networks. This paper
proposes and develops a P2P decentralized architecture
for the smart grid. Previous work has promoted data
transfer taking place between different levels of smart
administration such as load aggregators, substations,
and operators, but a P2P solution has not been proposed
previously.
3.4. The Bitcoin Network
We borrow from the Bitcoin Network the concepts of
public encryption keys, distributed consensus, hashing
and digital signatures, and we present each one in detail
below.
Public Keys as Account Addresses. Public keys
serve as the account address of the users in the Bitcoin
network and it is recommended that a new public key be
used for each transaction. While public keys provide
identities for users in the network, nodes themselves
have no identities since each node can have many public
keys.
Distributed Consensus on Transactions. A key
challenge for digital currencies is achieving distributed
consensus through which honest nodes (non-malicious
or faulty) in the network agree upon and validate each
transaction; there must be agreement on who owns
which Bitcoin and which coins have been spent. For
example, if user Alice wants to pay Bob in Bitcoin, she
will broadcast a transaction message to all other nodes in
the Bitcoin network containing Alice’s digital signature
as a proof that she herself broadcast the transaction,
Bob’s public key as the recipient of the Bitcoin, and a
hash pointer that points to the previous transactions that
show Alice’s receipt of the coin that she is paying to
Bob.
Many transactions such as the one described above
will be broadcast into the network during a period of
time. Distributed consensus is achieved when all the
honest nodes in the network agree on the transactions
that occurred and the order in which they occurred.
At any given point in time, a full node has a record
(a Bitcoin ledger) of a chain of blocks of transactions
on which it has already achieved consensus and a list
of outstanding transactions that it has heard but about
which it has not yet achieved consensus. Here, a block
is a record of a series of transactions, and a Bitcoin
ledger contains a series of blocks each of which contains
a series of transactions, that together form a block chain.
The block chain is a data structure in which each block
contains a hash pointer to the previous block that it
extends.
To achieve consensus among the nodes on the record
of the transactions, each full node in the Bitcoin network
has a record of all the transactions that have ever taken
place since the genesis block. In each round, a node
is selected from the network to propose the next block
in the chain. If the randomly picked node is honest, it
will have already checked the validity of the transactions
in the block it is proposing. Transactions are validated
by checking if the digital signatures are valid and if
the transactions being referenced have not been spent
already. In case the node that is randomly picked is
malicious and not honest, the other nodes will implicitly
disapprove the proposed block chain by not extending
their existing chain with the newly proposed block. This
is possible because all the other nodes that did not get
selected have their own list of transactions that they have
been recording and validating. If the transactions in
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the proposed block cannot be validated by these other
nodes in the network, the other nodes will not extend
their block chain. This idea of distributed consensus is
adapted for the proposed smart grid privacy framework.
Hashing Algorithms and Proof of Work. Hashing
algorithms are frequently used to checked message
integrity, and determine which node gets to propose the
next block in the blockchain ledger. The Secure Hashing
Algorithm SHA-256 is used by the Bitcoin network and
is also adopted in the decentralized smart grid model
proposed in this paper.
The random selection of a node to propose the
next block in the chain is done using a SHA-256 hash
puzzle. The node that solves this SHA-256 puzzle the
fastest broadcasts its solution to all other nodes as a
“proof of its work.” Other nodes in the network verify
the solution to the hash puzzle before accepting the
transaction broadcast by the selected node. These nodes
show their approval by extending the block chain they
have in their own record. As long as more than 51
percent of the total computing power in the network is
honest, a malicious node will not be able to affect the
integrity of the network, since it is unlikely that any
single malicious peer will have enough computational
power to beat all of the honest nodes.
Pesudo-random selection with the SHA-256 puzzle
is another aspect of the Bitcoin network that used in
the proposed model of the decentralized smart grid.
Hardware options are presented in [14] and [15] helpful.
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA). Digital signatures are used to validate
transactions that are broadcast into the Bitcoin network.
The digital signature scheme used in the Bitcoin
network is based on elliptic curve cryptography. The
smart grid model we propose in this paper also uses
ECDSA to validate energy consumption data [16].
Communication standards such as OpenADR grant
third parties (ISOs and load aggregators) access to
consumer’s energy consumption data. Even though
this data may be aggregated, personally identifiable
information may still be vulnerable. Individuals running
the neighbor aggregators may be able to identify nodes
in the same neighborhood based on the load signatures
and other heuristics. Attribute-based encryption (ABE)
can be useful in this situation for access control.
However, entities with correct access policies will
still be able to identify the consumers easily in a
centralized architecture. Therefore, a more robust way
of anonymizing consumer data is necessary because
existing communication protocols like OpenADR and
OSGP do not guarantee anonymity from aggregators
and ISOs.
We propose a framework to ensure privacy for
consumer data in a smart grid. A significant obstacle
for anonymizing data, however, is that “identitiless”
consumers do need to be billed for their actual kWh
consumption. Data anonymization protocols for the
smart grid need to both consider mechanisms to validate
that consumers have paid their bills, and also protect
consumer identities. In the next section, we present
a mathematical protocol that can be used to bill
identitiless consumers.
3.5. Billing with Zero-knowledge proofs
(ZKP)
A solution to the problem of billing identitiless
consumers can be drawn from an alternate digital
currency called the Zerocoin, that incorporates escrow
services within the coin protocol itself through use of a
zero-knowledge probabilistic proof to allow mixing of
coins to strengthen anonymity [17].
Working Principle of Zero-Knowledge Proof
(ZKP). Interactive zero-knowledge proofs can be used
to verify whether a consumer has paid a bill without
revealing the consumer’s identity. Such proofs are
“interactive” because the verification of whether the bill
has been paid by a particular consumer depends on an
interaction between the two parties, the prover and the
verifier.
Zero-knowledge proofs enable an entity to prove
that it has some knowledge without revealing the
knowledge itself [18]. For billing in the smart grid,
a zero-knowledge proof with the elliptic curve digital
signature algorithm (ECDSA), is simple as well as
efficient [19].
The next section presents our model for the smart
grid. This model draws from different ideas discussed
thus far. The model presented under Solution is the
contribution of the paper in the field of smart grid.
4. A Decentralized Solution for Security
and Privacy in the Smart Grid
The objective of this paper is to develop a
decentralized and anonymity-preserving framework for
the exchange of energy consumption data in the smart
grid. The contribution of this paper is the development
of a P2P and Bitcoin-like architecture for the smart
grid. A challenge for smart grid evolution is the lack
of privacy protections for consumer energy consumption
data.
In this section, a privacy-preserving, decentralized
model for smart grid data collection is presented. The
major elements of the proposed model are presented
in Figure 1, that capture’s the solution in its entirety.
A method to decentralize the smart grid is discussed
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below, followed by a discussion of the form of messages
that will be sent to the peers within the proposed
decentralized architecture. The role of certification
authorities is then highlighted, followed by a section
discussing how a public ledger of energy usage
messages, EUM, will be kept. Next, ideas borrowed
from Bitcoin for random node selection and associated
incentives are presented, in the context of the smart
grid. Zero-knowledge probabilistic proofs for billing
anonymous consumers is presented at the end of this
section.
4.1. Decentralization
For the purpose of this discussion, power system
infrastructure can be thought of as a graph. Nodes
(resident or commercial entities with smart meters)
in the system are modeled in a way similar to the
nodes of a computer network, such as the internet.
Decentralization is introduced to the power system by
modeling the power system as an overlay peer-to-peer,
P2P, network where each commercial or residential
entity is a node in a large graph. Instead of the
widely proposed client-server communication paradigm
between the utilities/aggregators and the commercial or
residential consumers, all of the entities of the power
grid are seen as peers in the network in our model.
In this decentralized paradigm, no central authority
higher up in the supply chain has control over all the
customer data in a manner that would allow linking
consumers to their energy consumption data. Energy
consumption data is kept as a public ledger, as with
blockchain, that any user in the network could access.
Although accessible by all users, this public ledger can
build on experiences with Bitcoin to prevent any user
from making associations between specific users and
their energy consumption data. Thus, this design will
be analogous to a blockchain in the Bitcoin network
where the blockchain is a public ledger of anonymous
transactions, further discussed below.
4.2. Public Key as Node Addresses
Public accessibility of energy consumption data
warrants maximum care be taken to protect consumer
anonymity. Similar to the Bitcoin network, public
keys are used as node addresses. This allows origin
verification for energy consumption data restraining it
to approved smart meters within the network.
Nodes are encouraged to change public keys
frequently to prevent adversaries from clustering energy
data of a single public key.
4.3. Energy Usage Message (EUM) and EUM
Validation
We propose that the record of energy consumption
by different nodes be maintained in a manner similar
to the Bitcoin network. Nodes are configured so that
they broadcast data about their energy consumption to
all the other peers as frequently as needed. To automate
the EUM broadcasting process, gateway devices such
as smart meters can be programmed to send out energy
usage messages (EUMs) regularly at a consistent time
intervals. The broadcast EUM contains:
• A time-stamp recording the time when the EUM
was created and first broadcast,
• The total energy consumption data for the node in
that time-step, and
• A digital signature of the source smart meter. To
allow for smaller key size, ECDSA is proposed
for the digital signature scheme.
Smart meters broadcasting EUMs need to frequently
change their public key that is recorded in the EUMs that
they broadcast. Each smart meter is allowed to create
as many key pairs as desired by the consumer. These
keys need to be registered with a trusted certification
authority to ensure only the registered smart meters
can successfully broadcast messages into the smart grid
network. After receiving an EUM broadcast by a peer,
each node validates the received EUM by verifying the
digital signature in the EUM as signature of one of
the approved smart meters in the network. The digital
signature is verified with the help of a certification
authority.
4.4. Certification Authority (CA)
In our decentralized model for the smart grid,
validity of an EUM and consequently the authenticity
of the smart meter broadcasting the EUM, is checked
via public keys. Dedicated smart grid certification
authority can be put in place to authenticate these public
keys so that unregistered meters or adversaries cannot
broadcast fake EUMs into the network. All approved
smart meters have pre-installed certificates from the
power grid certificate authority. Only the public keys
belonging to approved smart meters are accepted as a
valid EUM by the peer nodes. If an EUM comes from a
node without a valid certificate, the peers will not record
the message neither will they pass the EUM along to
other peer.
In the context of our model, each registered
smart meter receives identical, non-transferable
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and non-reproducible token signed by the trusted
certification authority. This token needs to be presented
to the certification authority by the smart meter to
receive a certificate for each new key pair that the smart
meter generates. The initial tokens to be used for key
generation are identical for all smart meters meaning
that the certification authorities themselves cannot
distinguish between different smart meters. CAs will
only be able to verify whether a given public private
key pair is valid or not. Therefore, consumer identity is
not compromised in this process. A secure connection
(SSL or TLS) should be used for all communications
between the smart meters and the CAs to protect against
man-in-the-middle attacks. For billing, a smart meter
records energy consumption data before broadcasting
the EUM.
One natural question to ask at this point is
what if the consumers with registered smart meters
themselves are malicious? One safeguard for this
case is to make the smart meter non-tamperable and
non-programmable. Any attempts to tamper with the
meter should disconnect the meter from the network.
4.5. Public ledger of EUM
Let us assume that our smart grid model sends
energy usage data to the utilities every m minutes. All
participating peers in the network will keep a record of
all the EUMs they have received during an m-minute
interval. We call this record of a series of EUMs
collected every m minutes an e-block, or energy-block.
Every time a node receives a valid EUM from its peer, it
adds that EUM to the current e-block; an EUM is added
only once to avoid duplication. To transfer the e-blocks
to the neighbor aggregators, a node from a neighborhood
is polled every m minutes with a SHA-256 puzzle. After
being polled, the selected node sends an e-block to
the neighborhood aggregator. Neighborhood aggregator
then forwards the data in the e-block to the utilities.
They data in the e-block can be statistically aggregated
before being sent to the utilities.
Because we have a P2P paradigm, neighborhood
aggregators themselves are a peer in the network and
will have their own record of EUMs, and this provides
several advantages for our model. Neighbor aggregators
nodes can be maintained by the utilities or by other
trusted third parties. When an aggregator receives
an e-block from the polled node, it can compare the
EUMs in the e-block it received against it own record
of EUMs. After the neighborhood aggregator forwards
an e-block to the utility, it lets the peers in the P2P
network know which e-block was forwarded to the
utilities by broadcasting the e-block into the network
with neigborhood aggregator-marked digital signature.
This way, nodes can check an keep of list of EUMs that
they had in record that did not make the e-block sent to
the utility.
In case an EUM brodcasted during a
particularm-minute interval does not make the e-block
sent to the utility, a few more attempts to broadcast can
be made. This will mean that peers will add this EUM to
the next e-block. If an EUM does not make any e-block
sent to the utilities even after trying for a few more m
minute intervals, the message can be discarded because
it will no longer be useful for calculating fluctuations in
demand every couple of minutes. Time stamp on every
message helps decide when to discard a message.
Nodes can discard any e-blocks which they have had
in record for more than an hour or so. After an hour of
its creation, an e-block’s data has most likely reached
the utilities already and if not, the data contained in
the e-block is no longer useful in calculation of hourly
electricity prices. Hence, deleting an e-block an hour
after its creation saves the local nodes from having to
maintain a large ledger of data.
4.6. Random Node Selection and Verification
Random node selection process in our model is
similar to the random node selection process in the
Bitcoin network. Every m minutes, a SHA-256, similar
to the one in the Bitcoin network, is presented to the
nodes in a neighborhood. The puzzle presented in
the smart-grid network is also a search puzzle. There
is no other way to solve the puzzle except searching
the answer space. This “randomizes” the process of
node selection. Like the Bitcoin uses a nonce and a
service string related to parameters such as the hash of
the previous block in its SHA-256 puzzle, smart grid
network can use the header information related to the
previous e-block that was sent to the utility and a nonce
to build its SHA-256 puzzle. This way a consistent
SHA-puzzle can be built for all nodes in the network.
The fastest node to solve the SHA-256 puzzle
sends the e-block it has in record to the neighborhood
aggregator. As illustrated in Figure 1, this message
contains the solution to the hash puzzle in addition to
an e-block. The neighborhood aggregator first verifies
the solution to the has puzzle in the message. If the
solution is correct, the aggregator forwards the data in
the e-block to the utilities, else another node needs to be
polled from the network.
A neighborhood aggregator should keep accepting
e-blocks from the nodes until it finds an e-block with
the correct hash solution. This way, in case the hash
solution of the first node it hears from does not match,
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neighborhood aggregators can take the e-block from the
next node that solved the puzzle correctly.
The decentralized smart grid protocol in its entirety
has been captured by Figure 1.
Figure 1. A Decentralized Model for the Smart Grid.
4.7. Incentive for Smart Grid Participation
Some form of incentive is necessary to get the nodes
to participate in the hash-puzzle race. Incentives are
specially necessary because the nodes will be spending
some computational power in trying to solve the puzzle.
In our model, smart meters themselves can be the
computers that attempt to solve the puzzle. Application
specific integrated circuits (ASIC) designed to solve
SHA-256 can be incorporated into the smart meter to
give them computing power to solve SHA-puzzles.
Like the Bitcoin network rewards 25 BTCs to
the first node to solve SHA-256 puzzle, a significant
reduction in electricity price can be offered to the first
node to solve smart grid hash puzzle. The cost of this
reward to the electrical authorities will be offset by
the reduction in cost of production brought about by
behavioral change due to demand response and dynamic
pricing. The expected probabilistic reward needs to be
larger in value than the cost of maintaining a Bitcoin
node.
4.8. Channel
Similar to Bitcoin, communication between the
smart meters can take place over the Internet. Using
already existing internet infrastructure for sending
energy consumption messages means that the initial
start-up cost can be minimal. However, using a
dedicated channel could reduce network congestion and
latency.
4.9. Connection and Re-connection
The initial connection of any smart meter to the
smart grid network can follow the the process of of
Satoshi Client Discovery. Bitcoin nodes can use one
of many potential methods to discover seed peers to
join the network [20]. Furthermore, all approved smart
meters can come with seed addresses of some peers
maintained by the utilities which will help the new smart
meters connect to the smart grid network. This way,
even if a single node or a portion of the network get
disconnected for a while, they can reuse the seed address
to get back into the network. Again, our model erases
the single point of failure problem.
4.10. Additional Privacy and Security Tools
In addition to the elements already described, more
tools can be incorporated into the proposed model to
strengthen security and privacy of the consumers. Tools
like data aggregation, differential privacy and access
control will be discussed in context of our model.
Aggregation. Privacy can be strengthened by
making all the nodes participate in data aggregation.
As the peers keep receiving EUMs, they can add
up the energy consumption data of each EUM they
receive. Peers will record this sum of EUMs in their
e-block. This way, an e-block does not contain a record
of power consumption data per user per minute but
will have the total energy consumption data for the
entire neighborhood for m minutes. This provides the
granularity in time necessary for demand response while
improving privacy.
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy can
be implemented at the node level in place of data
aggregation. Peers will make energy consumption data
they have received in m-minute interval differentially
private before forwarding the data to the neighborhood
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aggregators. To achieve this, synthetic e-block with
statistical properties similar to the record of EUMs in
the original e-block are generated by each peer node.
Each e-block stills contain energy usage per user per
minute but contribution of individual nodes remains
indistinguishable. This achieves better privacy and more
granularity in terms of time as well as the number of
users.
Access Control. There exist additional entities in
the power grid besides utilities, operators, consumers
and neighborhood aggregators. Several different
entities might be involved in the process of generation,
transmission and the distribution of electrical energy.
Attribute-based encryption can be incorporated into our
decentralized model for access control among these
entities. Before broadcasting an EUM, a node gives
attributes to its energy consumption data and encrypt it.
For example, data can be given attributes such that it can
be decrypted only by the utilities or by operators or the
maintenance. This way, not every entity of the grid gains
access to all of the data.
4.11. Billing and Zero-Knowledge Proof
For our decentralized model, zero-knowledge
probabilistic proofs can be used for billing. In order
to use zero-knowledge proof to verify if a consumer
has paid their electricity bill, solution x to a discrete
log problem y = gx mod p can be distributed to those
consumers who have paid their electricity bill. Each
node will have to acquire a new x every billing cycle
and a knowledge of x will prove that the consumer has
paid her bill. The verification of payment that is the
verification of knowledge of x will be done by the peers.
For verification to be possible, all nodes in a
neighborhood will have to have knowledge of the public
parameters of some DLP. Neighborhood aggregators can
broadcast these public parameters into the smart grid
P2P. Same DLP can be used inside a neighborhood
but different DLPs should be used across different
neighborhoods.
Nodes in a neighborhood can query the peers they
are connected to every billing cycle asking for a proof
of knowledge of x. Inability of a peer to give a proof
of knowledge of x will mean that the peer has not paid
her bill. To prevent a node from generating a new
address(key pairs) every billing cycle to join the network
without paying the bill, certification authorities are set
up to check for the solution for the DLP of the last billing
before issuing a certificate. In case a consumer has not
paid her bill, a message can be sent by peers to the
gateway device such as smart meter so as to temporarily
disconnect the node from grid. “Zero-knowledge” proof
is necessary in this model because disclosing the value
of x will mean even the nodes that have not paid their
bills will know x.
Care has to be taken because ZKP discussed here is
a simplification. Engineering ZKP-based billing system
is complex. The implementation of some form of
protection against node-collusion is also needed.
5. Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to introduce security
and privacy issues related to demand response and smart
metering in the smart grid, and propose a decentralized
architecture to address these privacy and security issues.
This paper presents the basic elements of a
decentralized framework for energy consumption data
exchanges in a smart grid. Some potential areas for
further research include:
• Congestion control for EUMs during peak times
• Hardware required to solve the SHA-256 puzzles
• The frequency of price calculations and responses
of peers in the proposed P2P framework
• Ideal neighborhood size for data aggregation
• EUM message size and required storage capacity
The cost of electricity production varies diurnally
and seasonally. Economically efficient consumption
of electricity requires relaying prices that reflect the
changing cost of production back to the consumer.
Use of smart appliances that respond to changing
price signals requires availability of a consumer’s
energy consumption data. This data about consumer’s
electricity consumption behavior has physical as well
as network security risks associated with it. Therefore,
anonymizing consumers’ energy consumption data can
add tremendous advantages to the smart grid. This
work set out to solve this problem of consumer data
anonymization using the Bitcoin network as a model.
Inspired by anonymous digital currencies such as
Bitcoin and Zerocoin, this work established ECC,
SHA-256 random selection, sufficient incentives and
zero-knowledge proof as some of the important features
needed in a decentralized smart grid architecture.
The overall architecture of a decentralized smart grid
proposed here maps the features in our model to their
parallels in the Bitcoin and Zerocoin networks. The
proposed framework protects consumer privacy, and
promotes security by employing features well tested by
the crypto-community. In addition, this model can work
over the Internet with means no significant set up cost
for addition infrastructure will be required.
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